Abstract: Since 1992, UK corporate governance has been guided by an evolving code of practice. This paper examines the debates during codification and revision, focusing on one issue, board design, and through a close reading of contributions to consultations, it shows the process had three outcomes: It valorised and institutionalised concerns of corporations and investors, but in ways legitimated disparate views and actors. It thus suppressed competing logics, but in ways that allowed them to resurface later. However, over time it failed to engage emerging voices in a rapidly changing market context, raising questions over its likelihood to retain legitimacy.
Introduction
A quarter of a century ago, the reforms entailed in the Cadbury Code set much of the world on a course towards a new type of corporate governance, shaking up and codifying the structures of corporate boards. It and subsequent iterations of what is now called the UK Corporate Governance Code are widely regarded as hallmark achievements in institutional development, incorporating guidelines tight enough to allow those sitting outside to track performance, with the flexibility to allow those inside to bend those structures to withstand a storm. The code has been seen as a tremendous success, if success is assessed by the degree of compliance and the effort norms of boards.
In view of the financial crisis of 2007-09 and the long economic malaise that followed, the code might equally be considered a failure. It was born in an emergency, to prevent future major corporate failures like the near-simultaneous collapses of Polly Peck, Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and the two listed companies run by Robert Maxwell, which had precipitated creation of the Cadbury Committee and then informed its work.
1 But the failures of Northern Rock in 2007 and the next year of HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 2 were more severe in their consequences -for those firms, for the economic and financial system in which they operated, and for society at large -than anything the Cadbury Committee had to contemplate. Moreover, these three banks had largely adhered to the recommendations of the code, and where they did not comply, they provided an explanation.
What went wrong? That question has multiple contextual dimensions, ranging from increasingly global capital markets to institutional arrangements in banking regulation. Yet we can also ask in what ways the code itself and the processes of its development had contributed to the shortcomings so obviously manifest in the near-meltdown of the banking system. This paper considers the latter question through a lens of how institutional change alters and then embeds control. The decision to codify corporate governance presented an opportunity to reconfigure control over corporations and the people who lead them. The code structured the previously unstructured work of boards. It established paths of accountability in a complex system of parties with interests in the corporation and its products, processes and performance.
Institutionalising certain solutions tends to favour one configuration of interests, while precluding attention to others. 3 In so doing, it establishes and then embeds relationships, introducing at least the potential for rigidity. To avoid that, and account for the complexity in corporate governance, the UK code has practised regular revision, re-opening the debate and letting old, rejected recipes to get another hearing and a chance of emerging. In effect, it has institutionalised the opportunity for de-institutionalisation.
This makes the failure of the code to prevent catastrophic collapses all the more puzzling.
How did the code, through repeated consultations, drafting and reformulations, fail to seek out other solutions, even as experiments, to address the risks and opportunities in the changing market and institutional contexts? To examine this question, this paper examines in detail a debate that raged during formulation of the Cadbury Code, 4 and afterwards, over one particularly contentious issue throughout the history of corporate governance: the design of the board of directors.
Specifically, the contestation concerned the choice between the unitary board favoured, in differing constellations, in UK and US practice, and the two-tier board common in continental Europe. As we will see, a close reading of the contributions of interested parties to the consultations undertaken by the late Sir Adrian Cadbury in 1991 and 1992 shows that the issue was hotly debated, and that Cadbury himself was open to alternatives. While victory on the large issue then went to the incumbents, the corporations and mainstream investors, more peripheral actors won many concessions towards what central actors feared would be a two-tier board via the back door. Moreover, the issue never goes to rest. As the next great crisis in corporate governance in the early 2000s, it arose again, only to get pushed back, but with still more adaptations. And again, in the wake of the financial crisis later in that decade, a protracted, three-stage consultation focused on it again, with the same outcome, yet still without a move towards the sort of experimentation that Cadbury had contemplated.
The study's contributions lie, first, in showing the richness of the debate and how central actors drown out but do not extinguish disparate voices; second, how the processes of consultation and the opportunities for revision win broad acceptance among the affected social actors. However, set against radically changing market and institutional contexts, this analysis, third, raises questions about whether continuity in that code and the actors engaged in drafting may, over time, undermine the legitimacy of the institution the code has become.
Theoretically, it shows also how the process of consultation legitimates institutional logics the code then discards. Rather than more the more typical depictions of hybrid or blended logics in accounts of institutional change, 5 this study shows how defeated logics remain suspended, ready to resurface when periodically the debate re-opens. That is, the process of codification and institutionalisation contains its own promise of deinstitutionalisation, allowing defeated logics to come back to life.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: We start with brief discussions the context of the code and of institutional theory and logics. The paper sketches the development of the code and its impact in the UK and abroad. Then we explore the market and institutional contexts to appreciate their shape at the time of the initial codification and how they have changes in subsequent years. After a discussion of methods, we then look in details at the debate over board design, in 1991-92, in 2003 , and then in the drafting of the 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code. This leads to a discussion of the code, consultation processes and the changing context to highlight how the code's evolving logic of corporate governance both informed practice and institutionalised. It also leads to questions about how well or poorly the process sits with the new context.
The code in context
In their analysis of how the language of the code has developed over time, Nordberg and This paper employs techniques from both those studies to look behind the scenes at how the code developed over time, drawing on the language used by a variety of actors in the centre and on the periphery of the debate, and those in between. What the actors say during consultations over the code help to surface the underlying logics they seek to embed in the new institution of the code and then defend over time.
Institutions and their logics
During the period under study, UK corporate governance moved from what institutional scholars terms a case of mimetic isomorphism, 9 in which boards copy what they see other boards doing, to a code of practice, setting out a body of rules -binding and yet voluntarythat become widely accepted. As we will see, the jolt to the status quo through corporate failures presents an opportunity to examine what rules apply, and why; that is to consider what logics underlie attitudes taken for granted.
Institutional logics have been defined as 'broad cultural beliefs and rules that structure cognition and fundamentally shape decision making and action in a field' 10 or the 'principles, practices, and symbols' that shape how reasoning takes place among actors adhering to an institution. 11 Green argues that institutional logics work like syllogisms, but with terms of the argument increasingly suppressed the more taken-for-granted the institution becomes.
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These logics are based in assumptions held in high level society orders; among them markets, corporations and the state are particularly relevant to this study. These orders give rise to logics that, like the organising principles in Puxty et al.'s study of accountancy.
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Where and when orders intersect, those taken-for-granted assumptions can conflict and the resulting contest of ideas may give rise to new institutional arrangements with new, blended or hybrid logics. Corporate governance scholars write about logics including shareholder value and managerialism 14 among others, which then inform the choices of boards.
Codification offers an opportunity to rethink logics taken for granted.
Development and impact of the UK code
The UK Corporate Governance Code is an evolving institution that has changed the conduct of boards of directors and institutional investors in many ways. It has also influenced thinking in many countries, 15 in Europe and further afield; not only in Commonwealth countries with institutional similarities to the UK, but also in civil law jurisdictions 16 and in the self-regulatory codes of the US stock exchanges. 17 Through its various revisions the code has prescribed mechanisms to foster good governance, including the separation of the role of CEO and chairman; the use of independent, non-executives directors; and creation of committees to consider remuneration, audit and nominations. The code valorises the unitary board of UK practice with its combination of executive and non-executive directors, while shifting the balance between them over time, with non-executives gaining a steadily more important role. In so doing it lays aside the idea of a continental European-style, two-tier board, though as we will see only after a fight and after concessions that seek to achieve somewhat similar aims. Each instance this paper examines involved more than 100 submissions. Analysis involved an initial reading of the all available texts, which ranged from one to 35 pages, followed by iterative reading of a sample selected on two theoretical grounds. First, the study applied a criterion of salience. Assuming that all respondent voices were legitimate, the analysis took the centrality of actors in the field as an indicator of power and the force of the language to indicate urgency. 33 This led to identification of texts using stronger rhetoric, the ones more likely, that is, to impress the codes' authors. Second, texts were selected from actors in different parts of the investment chain running from individual savers through banks and brokerages to layers of investment management. Initial, theory-led coding led to categorisation according to assumptions from perspectives including agency, stewardship and resource dependency, and by practice-led terms, including boards, directors, investors, advisers, etc. This close reading of the texts led to a second, data-led thematic categorisation, from which the topic of board design emerged as a candidate for closer examination. That issue concerned a structure deeply embedded in practice that seemed to stand little chance of being changed. But because of its political significance it did surface -and resurfaced -seeming to encapsulate the heart of the argument about corporate governance and the role of boards.
A shifting market and institutional context

Shape of the board
The unitary board has long been a feature of British corporate governance. Nonetheless, a debate emerged in all three periods: Should the UK retain its unitary boards or move towards a two-tier board favoured by the European Commission and arising in a particular form in Germany? That country's superior economic performance lent cognitive legitimacy 37 to the logic that two-tier boards are a 'better' instrument of corporate governance. The argument for a two-tier approach was that supervisory boards increase independence; the resulting challenge to the power of the executives might prevent the next shock.
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The argument against, often subtextual in this debate, concerns Germany's use of Mitbestimmung, or co-determination, a legal mechanism to involve labour unions in determining corporate policy. 39 The German system is often viewed as the principal contrast to Anglo-American practice. 40 Unitary boards unite one set of individuals in both a) the boundary-spanning 'service' activities, facilitating access to scarce external resources as emphasised in stewardship theory; and b) the performance-monitoring 'control' activities in agency theory. Dual board systems tend to emphasise the 'control' aspects of the upper or supervisory board.
Board design in the 1992 Cadbury debate
One reason for the sensitivity on this issue was a longstanding dispute over the European Labour party members, however, saw value in two-tier boards in submissions to the committee's early deliberations (CAD-01145, CAD-01148) and reflected in related articles in academic journals.
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Even after the election in April 1992 had unexpectedly given the Conservatives another term in power, the Liberal Democrats' response to the draft code (CAD-02443) urged two-tier boards with employee representation on the lower tier, management board. It also suggested that worker votes be counted alongside shareholder votes at the annual meeting.
That was an extreme position from a peripheral voice, a party with little realistic chance of coming to power soon. But the papers in the Cadbury archive suggest there was some sympathy for the topic within the committee. Jonathan Charkham, the Bank of England adviser attached to the committee, wrote to Cadbury during comment period on the draft assessing a proposal from two contributors to the consultation 44 to give specific powers to non-executives as 'three-quarters of the way to a two-tier board'. He continued:
There is much logic in what they propose but I have no doubt that it would arouse the fiercest wrath among our critics who can see only too clearly this kind of development coming and are thoroughly scared of real accountability (CAD-01073).
This note shows an important voice arguing that radical change of some sort was needed.
Indeed, two years after the code was published, when the committee was conducting its first and his committee undertook a more formal consultation to guide the final code, which was then published in December. Because the draft elicited responses from a wide spectrum of people and organisations affected, the rest of this discussion will concentrate on the more formal, second phase.
In its review of those responses, the Cadbury Committee took special note of three categories of respondents from companies, investors and the accountancy profession, an analytic device followed here. They were summarised for committee members in CAD-02255, CAC-02257, CAD-02259, respectively.
Investor reactions: Fund management organisations, in the main, wrote dispassionately, but they expressed concern over steps that might split corporate boards into opposing camps of executives and non-executives. One contributor sees something 'dangerous' in the draft, but 'in one or two places'; another says draft makes 'too great a distinction' but adds director interests are only 'somehow opposed'; a comment on the 'different roles but equal responsibilities' accepts division even as it affirms unity; changes 'may bring a distinction' between classes of directors; the report 'undermines' the concept of the unitary board, but only 'to some extent'. (For the fuller context of these remarks, see Table 1 ).
Place Table 1 about here
An important voice was that of the Association of British Insurers (ABI), whose membership invested in assets amounting to about 25 per cent of the value of the stock market at the time. Many were themselves listed companies, and so had interests straddling the investor/corporation divide. The ABI eschewed emotive language on this issue, with the exception of the ambiguously placed word 'disappointing' in the following passage:
It is perhaps disappointing that there are some who clearly feel that the recommendations undermine the concept of the unitary board, and it might be helpful if the final report emphasised rather more forcefully the support for the unitary board (ABI, CAD-02467).
At first its disappointment seems to be with the 'some' who criticise the draft report, suggested by the proximity of the two words. But the ABI is not in substance disappointed with those who defend the unitary boards. It is disappointed, rather, with the Cadbury Committee for not being more firmly in favour of them, though that point comes clear only after the friendly offer of something 'helpful'. The word order and diction thus seek to accommodate sensitivities to criticism on this point. That this voice needed to be accommodated becomes clear from the committee's own minutes (e.g. CAD-01303).
The Pensions Investment Research Consultants (PIRC), a proxy voting advisory firm representing mainly local authority pension plans, took a stronger line than mainstream fund managers in favour of unitary boards, but with a different aim:
At present many companies insulate some or all of the executive directors from the need to retire and seek election by shareholders. We think this is a serious infringement of shareholder rights and reduces directors' accountability. It also strikes at the heart of the unitary board in which all directors are equally accountable under law (PIRC 45 ).
As these sentences make clear, PIRC is concerned about increasing accountability through elections. It wants to ensure that executive directors face re-election to the board just as often as non-executives. This seeks a different type of board unity than other respondents had in mind, one seeking stronger control over executives, not greater cooperation in the boardroom.
Accountancy reactions: Generally though not entirely, the accountants' contributions on board design objected to the draft and defended the corporate status quo. The first two of the responses in Table 2 ameliorate the critique with phrases like 'tends to imply' and 'understand and accept'. But the more forceful language ('unrealistic', 'inimical') of the third quote, from Ernst & Young, suggests that feelings were strong. In a handwritten note (CAD-02475), Sir Adrian commented that he was 'a bit shaken by the Ernst & Young demolition
Place Table 2 about here
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), an important professional association whose members included many company chairmen and finance directors, responded to the draft more gently than the accountancy firms themselves:
Many have commented, too, that the report appears to recommend structures and systems which bring about the existence of something close to a two-tier board, in everything but name. The recommendation in favour of a leader for the independent element on the board, where the chairman and chief executive role is combined, and for the use of outside advisers by non-executives are examples in support of this perception. We believe that the truth or otherwise of this assessment should be more fully addressed in the final report and that it would be valuable if a discussion of the comparative merits of unitary and two-tier boards in the UK environment could be included, additionally. We do not, incidentally, favour the appointment of a leader for the non-executive directors (ICAEW, CAD-02181).
The mild phrasing of 'it would be valuable' can be read as a quiet taunt to the Cadbury Committee to justify its position; the word 'incidentally' undermines with irony the neutral reference earlier in the passage to the idea of a leader of the non-executives.
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Corporate reactions: Corporate critiques were unequivocal in advocating a unitary board and opposing European approaches, including two selected for special mention in the summary document circulated to the full committee (CAD-02255):
This risks appearing to encourage a two tier board system, and detracts from the fundamental concept of collective board responsibility. Any change in this approach should be statutory. Assuming the Committee supports the UK's unitary system, it should explicitly state this, and the reasons why it prefers this system (Sir Patrick Sheehy, chairman of British American Tobacco 48 ).
The whole thrust of the report is to retain the unitary board but to attempt to engraft a two-tier structure on to it. This is not a workable arrangement (The General Electric Co. plc; in the summary but also in CAD-02115).
That summary did not, however, record some of the stronger sentiments received from the corporate side, excluding ones using the emotive words 'danger', 'resist', 'erode', 'poachers' and 'sham', nor an appeal to more rationalist considerations (from Sir Adrian's former family chocolate company) concerning possible loss of 'commercial advantage'.
These remarks are summarised in Table 3 :
Place Table 3 about here
Perhaps the most forceful statement came not from a submission to the committee, but instead an opinion column published in the Financial Times newspaper, written by Sir Owen Green, chairman of BTR and an emblematic executive of the era. 49 The article was provocatively titled 'Why Cadbury leaves a bitter taste'. He criticised many aspects of the draft report, including the idea of a 'leader' of the non-executives, and asserted that A more divisive aspect … is the way it strikes at the heart of the unitary The phrase 'reveals its real purpose' signals a conspiracy exposed, while 'divisive' warns of adverse consequences and 'strikes at the heart' points metaphorically at murderous intent towards the British way of organising boards. The forcefulness of its sentiment and the impact of its argument is indicated by how Green's column was quoted in the committee's summary of contributions, in notes between committee staff, and by various letters that favourably cited Green's remarks.
Support for two-tier boards:
Only a few voices supported the idea of two-tier boards, none with the fervour of the Liberal Democrats. The accountancy firm Arthur Andersen, in a detailed and closely argued analysis, said the committee had paid insufficient attention to what it termed the three roles of boards: supervision, control and management:
We believe the Report should be more forthright with respect to the supervisory function of the board. It should clarify the objectives and procedures that fall within the supervisory function and recommend that in all circumstances, the supervisory role should be led by a specific non-
The Report is predicated on the view that the unitary system is appropriate and the unitary board is itself capable of fulfilling the supervisory function.
While we accept that the recommendations in the Report will facilitate supervision, it is disappointing that the Report does not discuss the advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of governance and encourage experimentation (Arthur Andersen, CAD-02361).
While emphasising 'supervision', the term used for the upper board in a two-tier system, this language falls short of advocacy of European-style boards. The phrase 'predicated on the The report's subliminal message is of the need for total integrity and a healthy objectivity in company affairs. This is strongly to be supported. But the need for a code in addition to existing rules and regulations is doubtfulas is its likely effectiveness in reducing the relatively few instances of misbehaviour. 55 His use of 'subliminal message' evokes symbolically the spectre of manipulative advertising techniques, which had entered public and academic discourse over in previous decades through critiques of technologies to project images interstitially in television signals. 56 Although Green endorses the message, he opposes the medium of its delivery.
In his briefing to the committee about feedback on the draft, Sir Adrian worried about the tone: 'We are said to be 'long on accountability and short on drive and efficiency' and to take a negative view of governance'; the code risked 'dividing the board'. The first part of these comments highlights the draft's emphasis on control, rather than service, as the function of corporate governance; dividing the board would divide those functions. He then added remarks that imply the code could damage the unity of a board with a weak chairman:
Do we stay with these? Minor changes … are no problem. I accept that there is a fundamental issue here and that there could come a point when logic would point to a two-tier board. I do not believe we are at that point yet, (although those who advocate distinct legal duties for ned's 57 would pass it), and that the unity of boards need not be undermined by our proposals, given a competent chairman (Sir Adrian Cadbury, CAD-01265).
The tone of the code changed as a result of the comments and criticism, but these notes from the Cadbury archive suggest the issue was still alive under the surface, even after the final version's support for the unitary board. That Sir Adrian thought 'there could come a point when logic would point to a two-tier board' suggests that the issue was still open, even though hostility had closed it, for now.
Board design in the 2003, post-Higgs debate
With the collapse of Enron, WorldCom and many other corporations 58 in the opening years of the millennium, and the implosion of accountants Arthur Andersen, the Labour government in the UK felt something more had to be done. It commissioned a major study of corporate boards, and in particular the role of non-executive directors.
In the covering letter to his report for the Department of Trade and Industry, Derek The passage from Higgs quoted above considers a unitary board to be an implicit good, and in one of the introductory paragraphs he elaborates that view:
Some have argued that the increasing complexity of business life -whether globalisation or fast changing product and capital markets -is such that the whole structure of the board needs to be re-considered. But the majority view, which I share, sees considerable benefits continuing to flow from the unitary approach.
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As if to emphasise that point, he later adds:
Increasing the effectiveness of non-executive directors, while preserving the benefits of the unitary board, is a principal objective of the Review…. In contrast, the European system of corporate governance typically separates legal responsibility for running the company between a management and a supervisory board. In the US, the board is composed largely of nonexecutive ('outside') directors with only a few executives. Evidence collected during the Review has not convinced me of the merits of moving away from the unitary board structure in the UK. 63 This language shows, however, that the debate over board design was not over. 66 where 'should' also sits underneath the code's 'comply-or-explain' principle.
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI), representing the interests of large corporations, used more forceful language to make a similar point. It expressed 'deep reservations' about provisions that 'concern or affect the chairman', whose role is 'pivotal in the UK's tried and tested unitary board system'. The choice of 'pivotal' here echoes with irony Higgs's own language, 67 seeking to reverse its inferred intent. The CBI's next sentence elaborates this concern relating it to separate meetings of non-executives, suggesting the provision 'could be misunderstood and could lead to a two-tier board in practice ' (16 April 2003) . The use of 'could be misunderstood' is an example of language aimed at repairing unintended damage in drafting to maintain the core values of the code. The word might also be seen as a diplomatic way of disrupting a feared change in direction. As in the ABI submission, the value in a unitary board does not receive, or seem to require, explanation or articulation; neither does the 'danger' or 'risk' in a two-tier board. Sentiments like these might have appeared to be boilerplate, language dusted off and reused from a previous consultation paper and not of import, except that the issue was still alive among other actors in the field. Some of them were fringe actors, but others, like the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), were closer to the centre. A professional body with longstanding engagement in corporate governance and many of its accountant-members working in corporations, the ACCA would not normally be seen as peripheral to the field, but its first submission stated:
As a first step, the FRC should consider the implications of introducing as an option a two-tier board structure and should consider the changes to the To draw attention to the failure of independent directors is not to say that less reliance should be placed upon them in the future. But consideration needs to be given to addressing the causes of their ineffectiveness.
While two-tier board structures have not always been notably successful, they can contribute to ensuring that the supervisory board directs and oversees, while the management board manages. In practice, much depends on the composition and powers of the two boards in a two-tier structure (ACCA, May 2009, p. 2) .
The early mention in (albeit limited) support for two-tier boards through the debate signals that the idea has legitimacy among at least some actors in the field, even though it remains a largely alien concept.
Contributors on the other side, however, affirm the counter-argument but leave it largely unarticulated. The CBI, for example, states that its members, 'including investor members, strongly uphold the UK's unitary board system'; it later states: 'there is also a need to avoid proposals that tend towards two tier boards' (CBI, October 2009). Use of the passive voice here sweeps away any actor, as if the reader -that is, the authors of the code -needed no explanation. The argument was suppressed because its logic was taken for granted.
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Discussion
The issue of board design is emblematic of the purpose of the board. Is this structure for shareholders, for stakeholders, or for the business as a whole? In terms of institutional theory, should the code adopt a logic of shareholder primacy rooted in markets, of representing larger interests rooted in community, or of commerce, rooted in the corporation? Institutional theorists argue that such logics with each other, but the resolution does not always mean victory for one. Instead, logics may develop into a hybrid form 69 or become sedimented. 70 This study shows how the contestation of logics was not resolved. Instead, we see opposing logics legitimated through taking part in the debate, or left open through ambiguity. It shows logics neither defeated nor blended, but instead suspended. It also demonstrates how participation seems to develop its own logic, embracing a wide range of opinions without entirely settling the disputes.
Logics
Throughout these consultations, actors sought to win their arguments and appeals to these logics, which had been legitimated to a greater or lesser extent in other organisational fields.
Even when they made assertions, rather than arguments, the voices in the debate spoke as though their logics were understood and thus taken for granted, as institutional theory suggests. Moreover, some actors attempted to import competing logics from Europe or the US to the UK. That the arguments these logics entail often remained suppressed suggests that other actors already accept, at one level or another, the legitimacy of these solutions. The listed insurance companies that manage equity investments might reasonably be assumed to have faced contesting, even contradictory logics. What we see, however, is something rather different: the absence of conflict on this point, even when the investors were not listed companies or the individuals responding were not in positions to represent the corporate rather than functional (fund management) imperatives. Theirs was in the main a hybrid logic, claiming shareholder primacy but accepting the risk of managerialism in that non-executive directors might be captured by the executives for the sake of strong performance through collegiality and the 'service' function of directors.
The advisers, and especially the accountancy firms, echoed the sentiments of corporations and investors on this point, though not universally and not with the degree of assumption that the incumbent position needed no defence. But the profession was undergoing its own institutional change during this time, as reflected in public discourse, 71 involving a contest between professional and commercial logics 72 and perhaps making these actors more sensitive to corporate interests and values.
Those supporting two-tier boards and therefore institutional change came, with important exceptions, from more peripheral positions in the field. Their arguments draw upon a language of high performance, secure investments and long-term orientation, characteristics of German corporate performance. Their texts, mainly tacitly though from the most peripheral actors explicitly, invoke employee rights, stakeholder theory and the associated curbs on behaviour sometimes seen as rapacious Anglo-American capitalism. These are sentiments associated more with the collectivism, with its ideas of shared commitment. That these associations are not always explicit in many of the texts does not mean they are not there. They featured prominently in the discourse in news media at the time.
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Those actors straddling the debate were an eclectic bunch, in part peripheral, in part more central to the field. Some suggested novel approaches (e.g. the Liberal Democrats in 1992); others endorsed experimentation (Arthur Andersen in 1992 and, it seems, Sir Adrian Cadbury himself). They were the institutional entrepreneurs, 74 agitating for change of less specific character to address evident failings in current institutional arrangements. Their arguments embody assumptions or show the willingness to cross boundaries.
How this debate was resolved has had a variety of effects for the relationship between the corporation and investors and on the relationships across the field, in shaping a language of corporate governance that gains acceptance and builds a community. But at the same time, set against the changing context, the debate raises questions about the code's affirmation a set of mainstream actors increasingly less central to the investment field.
These expressions of ambiguity and the suppression of arguments, assumed and taken for granted, suggest that actors have and want room to interpret the logic as they see fit and blend it with others as circumstances require. 75 These half-made arguments, with their scope for reinterpretation by other actors, create room for accommodation with other actors, a way to set conflict to the side for the sake of agreement, in the knowledge, first, that the code will be revisited before too long, and second, that if corporations do not comply they will still have the option to explain.
Actors and their relationships
The detail of the debate analysed above shows that through this period, actors in the centre of the field -the traditional UK corporations and mainstream UK investors -lost more arguments than they won on measures like the prominence of non-executives and the use of That the debate has not concluded points to research opportunities tracking whether power consolidates in the centre of embraces more of the elements that the more peripheral actors wanted to see. In particular, the calls for experimentation in board design that Sir Adrian Cadbury acknowledged may be worth monitoring, in view of the failure of the mainstream solutions tried so far to prevent catastrophic corporate failures.
Acceptance of legitimacy of disparate voices
The debate, and the process that leads to continuing dialogue, gave legitimacy to a wide variety of actors and interests other than those in the centre of the field and with the cosy relationships of old in the City. It also provided a language in which the debate could be framed. One consequence was, therefore, the creation of a community of corporate governance made up of individuals who participated in the debate, even at several steps removed, and learned its language.
Here further research might explore the sociology of the field. Some of the actors whose The Report draws too great a distinction between the responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors and could be taken to imply that their interests are somehow opposed. We believe that the Code should place greater emphasis on the need for each director to recognise his responsibility for corporate governance, however the Board is constituted, and for the Board as a whole to recognise its responsibility and that of each of its members. Legal & General (CAD-02353) We are however concerned that Board balance between executive and non executive should not be translated into a separation into supervisory and non supervisory functions with the two-tier implication that that would suggest. We see the directors as having different roles but equal responsibilities, with all of them ultimately being responsible to those who elect them -the shareholders. British Rail Pension Fund (CAD-02453)
The additional duties proposed for non-executive directors (together with the previously mentioned head of non-executives) may bring a division into the board if non-executives are to take on a more supervisory role. It is probably more important for companies to describe their internal monitoring procedures and formally report on their operation in the annual report than for a general duty to monitor being ascribed to particular members of a unitary board. National Association of Pension Funds (CAD-02449) So far as reporting to shareholders is concerned, your suggestion that the chairman of the remuneration committee be responsible for answering questions at the Annual General Meeting may well undermine, to some extent, the concept of the unitary board. We understand and accept that there is a need for a division of responsibilities within a board and that no large listed company should be capable of being dominated by one individual but we are concerned about the apparent belief that within a board there should be two leaders. We feel very strongly that the duty of the Board (within the constraints of the law) as a whole is to create wealth for the investors. The Board has, therefore, to work as a team, and not to be put in a position where half the Board's main purpose appears to be to police the activities of the other half. We are concerned that whilst the report makes this point … the overall impression of the report, because it deals with controls is one where the vision of the nonexecutive is that he is there to dismiss the chief executive should this prove necessary rather than provide positive input to the future direction and success of the company. We believe non executive directors have an important role to play in bringing their broader experience to bear on the board's discussions. Ernst & Young (CAD-02447) We acknowledge the important contribution which non-executive directors can and should make in this direction but believe that the Committee's expectations of non-executive directors are unrealistic. We also believe that certain aspects of the role which the Committee proposes for non-executive directors are inimical to the concept of the unitary board…. The Committee's proposals would create a two-tier board within the legal structure of a unitary board. We do not regard this as tenable. In our view distinctions between the responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors, save in relation to remuneration, are both divisive and, for example, in the case of decision making through a two tier board, a sham.
Confederation of
British Industry (CAD-02349).
In that setting it is for the board to distribute functions to its members; attempts to reserve tasks as a rule to one class of directors will create the danger of opening the way to a two-tier system…. We oppose the words 'monitor the executive management' as imparting a supervisory role inappropriate to a unitary board. Institute of Directors I would resist any movement towards a two-tier system. I believe that paragraph 4.3 is unhelpful as the role of the non-executive directors outlined in it appears to conflict with the principle of a unitary board in so far as it implies that the purpose of the non-executive directors is to monitor the performance of the board. In this context, the non-executive directors must be monitoring the performance of the executive members of the board, not the board as a whole. The draft report should be amended to make it clear that the principle of a unitary board is upheld in all respects. Alick Rankin, Chairman, Scottish & Newcastle (CAD-
02455)
The code, as proposed, appears to identify non-executive directors as 'the gamekeepers' and executives as 'the poachers'. Clearly, this must be quite wrong. It is both divisive and intrusive and damaging to the positive partnership spirit essential in a unitary board. Nonexecutives have a strong requirement to encourage, to support and to enthuse -this concept is lacking and severely threatened by the proposals. Peter Jinks, Company Secretary, CadburySchweppes (CAD-
02385)
The emphasis on more involvement and accountability of Non-Executive Directors emerging from Corporate Governance must not result in or encourage two tier Boards, which would be of considerable commercial disadvantage to the company and its investors. 17 43 Cousins and Sikka, "Accounting for Change: Facilitating Power and Accountability, Mitchell and Sikka, "Accounting For Change: The Institutions of Accountancy,"---. 44 The 'Merrett-Sykes paper he refers to is not recorded in the Cadbury Archive, although Alan Sykes, managing director of Consolidated Gold Fields, mentions it in a separate comment on the draft report (CAD-02141). Anthony Merrett, a London Business School professor, and Sykes made a second proposal concerning the accountability of auditors (CAD-02185). 45 The PIRC submission itself is not recorded in the Cadbury Archive, but the firm provided a late draft of the document for this study, which is quoted here. The Cadbury Committee's summary of investor reactions cites long passages from the PIRC submission on other matters but only notes that PIRC supported a unitary board. It does not quote this passage. 46 The comment referred to the E&Y submission in general, which was also critical of the report in other matters. 47 For a wry look at the use of euphemisms in British speech, including 'incidentally', see
